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The Public Charities Controversy 1921-1926 
by B.L. VIGOD* 
During the years immediately following the end of the Great War, 
Quebec's time-honoured system of institutional charity found itself threat-
ened by a severe financial crisis. While private revenues of hospitals, 
asylums and refuges (creches, orphanages and night shelters) rose mini-
mally if at all, the demands on these institutions were increasing dramati-
cally. As soon as the war ended, grave concerns were expressed about 
the state of public health in the province. Then in late 1920, a brief but 
severe recession found almost all of these institutions unable to receive 
and care for a deluge of indigent or otherwise helpless individuals. Alex-
andre Taschereau, succeeding Sir Lomer Gouin to the Premiership in July 
1920, pledged his Liberal Government to an extensive campaign of disease 
prevention, directed initially at tuberculosis and infant mortality. 1 This 
commitment was, of course, universally applauded, as were a series of 
significant measures enacted in subsequent years designed to fulfill it. 2 
No such unanimous enthusiasm, however greeted the Government's 
response to the problem of financing charitable institutions, revealed in 
the Public Charities Act of 1921. 
This law seems eminently sensible in retrospect, and served as the 
statutory basis of welfare organization in Quebec for forty years. 3 Yet it 
provoked the most violent political controversy of the decade in Quebec 
provincial politics, leading one observer to suggest that memory of the 
reaction discouraged Taschereau and successors from further systematic 
reforms in the field. 4 Also, it has been assumed that the controversy, 
stemming from the state's intervention in a sphere previously reserved 
to the Church, was almost exclusively ideological in nature. 5 Michel 
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1 Archives nationales du Quebec, Fonds Louis-Alexandre Taschereau, "Discours-
programme", 27 juillet 1920. 
2 These included hygiene education, sanitation laws, cancer research, temporary 
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Brunet, for example, considered it a classic manifestation of anti-etatisme, 
one of the three retrograde ideologies whose prevalence in French Canadian 
society he bemoaned. 6 This article offers a review of the events of the 
controversy, an analysis of the ideological content of the debate, and 
finally a dose of revisionism in the form of a suggestion that ideological 
factors alone do not explain the clash. The last point implies a more general 
need to provide an institutional as well as an ideological dimension for 
analyses of Church-State relations in Quebec. 
* * * 
The postwar financial malaise of Quebec's charitable institutions was 
first revealed in their financial reports for 1919, which in spite of ad hoc 
provincial subsidies totalling $81,000, showed a deficit of $250,000. 7 Spread 
over about 165 institutions this was not in itself a staggering figure, but 
it represented merely the tip of an iceberg. For one thing, thousands of 
indigent clients and patients were already being refused for lack of facil-
ities. 8 Nor did this deficit yet reflect the full impact of the recession: 
increased indigence and decreased private contributions. From 1920 to 
1921, the number of man-days spent in refuges of various kinds rose more 
than twenty percent, from 3,582,510 to 4,329,639. In the same period 
private contributions to these institutions fell more than fifteen percent, 
from $628,178 to $525,976. 9 Some municipal governments were facing 
bankruptcy, a fact which severely limited the effect of a recent measure in 
the English poor law tradition requiring local councils to pay for the care 
of their own indigents. 10 In the case of hospitals, there was a crying need 
for modernization as well as expansion. 11 Finally, the incidence of financial 
distress was far from even, with M(\Iltreal institutions bearing the brunt of 
what was primarily an. urban crisis. A prime example was the Meurling 
Municipal Refuge, which provided night shelter and also sought jobs for 
employable clients. During 1919 it sheltered 2,971 persons for an average 
of nine days each; in 1920, 882 persons for ten days each ; in 1921, 4,300 
persons for an average of twenty days each; in 1922, 3,231 for twenty-
eight days each. As an indication of the source of this additional pressure, 
the average age of clients declined from 53 years to 42 years in 1920-
1921. 12 Evidently, men in the prime of their working lives were being 
reduced to dependance upon public assistance. The city was doing its best, 
especially under the provincially-imposed Administrative Commission 
6 See Brunet's review of two Rumilly volumes in the Revue d'Histoire de /'Ame-
rique fran~aise (juin 1953). 
7 Le Devoir 14 avril 1921, citing figures supplied by Taschereau. 
8 Ibid . 
9 QuEBEC, Sessional Papers, " Benevolent Institutions" (1921 to 1925). 
10 MoNGEAU , op. cit ., p. 44 ; Rumilly, op. cit. , tome XXV , pp . 111-112. 
11 QuEBEC, BuREAU OF PUBLIC CHARITIES, "Director's Report" (15 December 
1923), p. 9. See also Public Archives of Canada, C.A. Fitzpatrick Papers, W.H. Dobell 
to L.-A. Taschereau , 28 April 1921. 
12 MONTREAL BOARD OF HEALTH, Annual Reports (1919-1923) . 
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whose chairman gave personal direction to the Board of Health, but whose 
resources were not limitless. By 1920 so many institutions were making 
direct appeals to the Province 13 that existing legislation could provide 
neither the administrative apparatus nor the spending authority necessary 
for an adequate response. 
The government's legislative procedure in dealing with the problem 
proved to be both a symptom and a cause of the mutual distrust which 
later characterized the Public Charities controversy. The Throne Speech 
of 11 January 1921 had indicated that the Legislature would be called 
upon "a rechercher les meilleurs moyens ... de pourvoir aux charges crois-
santes que les circonstances imposent a l'assistance publique et a nos 
hopitaux", but nothing specific was indicated and the item did not seem 
to be a priority for the government. 14 The matter was not raised by either 
the premier or the leader of the opposition during the Throne Speech 
debate, and was discussed at length only in the "Catholic press" over the 
next two months. Then suddenly, in the very last hours of the Session, 
a fourteen-page bill was distributed·, given second and third reading and 
rammed through the Liberal-dominated Legislative Council. The normal 
practice of permitting interested parties to appear before the Public Bills 
Committee of the Legislature was ignored. The bill's sponsor, Provincial 
Secretary Athanase David, attempted to justify the steamroller tactics by 
arguing that the legislation was so well intentioned that no reasonable 
person would oppose it. Such arrogance was not typical of David himself, 
but the tactics were fully consistent with the reputation of the govern-
ment which he had recently joined. Quebec City's religious daily news-
paper, L'Action catholique, had warned at the outset that the public might 
be presented "aux dernieres heures de Ia session, de ces mesures d'une 
extreme importance dont personne n'avait entendu parler auparavant, et 
qui sont alors expediees a Ia vapeur, sou vent au grand detriment du bon 
sens et de I' interet public". 15 It may well be true that the government, 
foreseeing the controversy which would arise, preferred criticism of its 
procedure to a long debate over the substance of the legislation. But 
judging from statistics such as those cited for the Meurling Refuge, it is 
clear that Taschereau and David could also have felt confronted with a 
genuine emergency in the midst of that winter of 1920-1921. As late as 
February 2, Taschereau informed the Lieutenant-Governor that the legisla-
tion was still being drafted. 16 
The Public Charities Act established a cost-sharing formula for the 
care of indigents within public charitable institutions recognized by the 
Lieutenant-Governor in Council: one-third each by the institution, by the 
municipality of residence and by the Province. For the purp9se of determin-
13 Fitzpatrick Papers, Fitzpatrick to Henri Bourassa, 8 aout 1921. 
14 L'Action Catholique, 12janvier 1921. 
IS Ibid. 
16 Fitzpatrick Papers, Taschereau to Fitzpatrick, 2 fevrier 1921. Further evidence 
of urgent need can be found in the haste with which many institutions took advantage 
of the new law. See below, note 31. 
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ing the per diem cost of such care, the institutions were classified into 
fourteen categories and sub-categories. Both traditional sources of revenue 
(the poor tax and a duty on parimutuel betting) and a new ten percent 
amusement tax were to be collected by each municipality and then shared 
equally with a newly established Provincial Charities Fund. 17 Municipalities, 
many of whose finances the Province had already begun to oversee be-
cause of large debts, were authorized to promote the building of new 
facilities or the expansion of existing ones. 18 Finally, the Act created a 
Provincial Bureau of Public Charities with broad powers "de mettre a 
execution les dispositions de Ia presente loi et [de remplir] les autres 
fonctions qui peuvent leur etre assignees, de temps a l'autre, par le lieu-
tenant-gouverneur en conseil". Giving effect to the terms of the Act 
specifically included verification of financial requests and overseeing the 
expenditure of funds granted. 19 
II 
The parliamentary opposition led by Arthur Sauve, which often 
reflected episcopal opinion in such matters, appeared stunned and asked 
above all for delay in consideration of the bill. But L'Action catholique 
and Henri Bourassa's Le Devoir were quick to formulate more substantive 
criticism, with Bourassa re-issuing his own editorials, the text of political 
speeches and a copy of the Act itself in a separate pamphlet called Une 
Mauvaise Loi. No one denied that government leaders "ont obei a un 
sentiment genereux et tente de remedier a un mal reel". 20 Insisted Bouras-
sa, "Des 'bonnes intentions' du premier ministre je ne doute pas plus que 
de celles du Secretaire provincial. Que l'un et l'autre, et d'autres de leurs 
collegues .. . n'aient pas eu !'intention formelle et reflechie de 'laiciser Ia 
charite' je le crois sincerement." But good intentions did not guarantee 
satisfactory consequences, and for this reason Bourassa concluded that 
dangers inherent in the legislation made it unacceptable. Provisions of the 
Act stated clearly that the Province could do much more than subsidize 
private charitable institutions. 21 It could dictate the policy and supervise 
the daily operation of religious houses to the point of challenging diocesan 
and ordinal control. Its invasion of this once exclusive preserve of religious 
organizations would upset a satisfactory bal~nce of Church and civil 
17 Statutes of Quebec 11 Geo. V (1921) c. 79. Two important additional sources 
of revenue were later authorized: a restaurant meals tax for the municipalities and an 
annual transfer of $1 ,000,000 from Liquor Commission profits into the Provincial Fund. 
18 Although most attention was initially focused on the per diem subsidies accorded 
to charitable institutions, capital grants, loan guarantees and the actual funding of some 
municipal debts soon involved a comparable financial commitment on the part of the Pro-
vince. By 1930, for example, it was underwriting $12.6 million in loans and actually paying 
interest of $400,000 on loans contracted by institutions and municipalities. Quebec Statistical 
Yearbook /93/ p. 188. 
19 Articles 4, 5, 29 and 30 of the Act. 
20 L ' Action Catholique, 18 mars 1921. 
21 Le Devoir. 28 mars and 15 avril 1921. 
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authority in French Canadian society and afford a precedent to anticlericals 
and "atheists" intent upon a systematic erosion of religious influence. 
Even David, added L'Action catholique, was arguing in defense of the 
measure that "'Ia charite d'aujourd'hui est technique et elle est devenue 
une science'. Pardon. La charite est une vertu. C'est meme une des trois 
vertus theologales; une des vertus qu'un chretien digne de ce nom ne 
pourra jamais ignorer, meme sous pretexte que Ia loi pourvoit. Et elle 
restera une vertu." 22 In other words, the law challenged a fundamental 
Catholic precept that acts of charity were themselves morally and socially 
necessary quite apart from the physical welfare of the recipients. Moreover 
it threatened thereby to reinforce that growing selfishness and neglect of 
filial responsibility already worrying Catholic leaders in French Canada. 23 
In contrast to the speed with which Catholic journalists criticized 
the Act, the Roman Catholic hierarchy of Quebec delayed formal protest 
for nearly a year, by which time the Act had been proclaimed and the 
Bureau of Public Charities was operational. Even when the Bishops and 
Archbishops finally wrote to the Premier, they treated the Public Charities 
Act as only one of three political issues of legitimate and pressing concern 
to the Church, the others being taxation of ecclesiastical property and 
female suffrage. Nor was there anything new in their comments about the 
Act; they merely summarized, in very moderate language, the two major 
arguments developed by Le Devoir and L' Action catholique. Private 
charity was morally preferable to reliance upon the state, and the degree 
of state interference in the affairs of religious communities was both un-
necessary and unacceptable. In proposing alternatives, however, they 
did go one step beyond the earlier critics. Their more elaborate scheme 
involved creation of a "non-political" body analagous to the Council of 
Public Instruction through which public funds could be channelled without 
destroying the sectarian basis of social welfare organization. If this was 
impossible, then religious communities should at least require the approval 
of their ecclesiastical superiors before subjecting themselves to the condi-
tions imposed by the Act. 24 
Initially the Government defended itself in moderate though admit-
tedly self-congratulatory terms. David had anticipated many of the objec-
tions when he introduced the bill , while Taschereau dealt specifically 
with Bourassa's arguments in a speech before the Young Liberals of Mont-
real. The Premier attempted to demonstrate that the terms of the Act 
would not destroy the independence of either private institutions or munic-
ipalities. Nor was the Act "statist" in spirit; rather , it was designed 
precisely to preserve the voluntary and religious basis of welfare organiza-
tion. Only through the financial support now being made available, he 
argued, could the traditional structure hope to survive, and if the contrary 
effect were ever demonstrated the government would withdraw the Act. 25 
22 L'Action Catholique, 18 mars 1921. 
23 See also Le Devoir , 18 avril 1921. 
24 Fonds Taschereau, Archbishops and Bishops of Quebec to Taschereau, 12 jan-
vier 1922. 
2S Le Devoir, 18 avril 1921 . 
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Bourassa's fear that the Act afforded a dangerous precedent, Taschereau 
said later, was fear of "Ia perversion hypothetique des generations futures", 
and that was no basis upon which to reject the present good. ''Parce 
qu'on pouvait abuser de Ia charite a une epoque indeterminee, va-t-on 
bannir du parlement tous les actes de charite ?'' 26 Belief in the virtues of 
private charity was commendable, but so was realism. "Voyez par vous-
memes toutes les affreuses miseres a soulager, et dites-moi si le gouver-
nement n' a pas le devoir imperieux de venir en aide a nos institu-
tions pour leur permettre de realiser leur reuvre." 27 
Taschereau was again polite yet forthright in replying to the bishops' 
letter of January, 1922. The legal advice on which they had based their 
alternative proposal, he suggested, "porte plutot sur l'aspect religieux 
ou social de Ia loi que sur son aspect legal." Thus he would ignore the 
technical flaws contained in the proposal and address himself to the funda-
mental problem. The government could demonstrate by its past record 
that it had no radical intentions; in such a field as social assistance, how-
ever, one had to realize that "nous vivons dans un pays mixte. II y a 
des susceptibilites qu'il faut menager et des opinions qu'on ne peut ignorer. 
Autrement Ia vie politique devient impossible, et c'est a y renoncer." 28 
Compatibility with the doctrine and institutions of Catholicism could not, 
in other words, be the sole criterion for legislation. The government had 
no desire to interfere with the autonomy of religious communities or 
weaken hierarchical authority but it was required by law to oversee the 
expenditure of public funds. This alone, he insisted, accounted for the 
limited surveillance which it intended to practice over charitable institu-
tions. Amendments could be contemplated but no essential challenge to the 
system other than its complete abandonment, "laissant Ia responsabilite 
des miseres qui en resulteront aux critiques de cette loi". 29 
Following this exchange of letters, however, the debate, hitherto a 
reasonable affair, degenerated into a demeaning quarrel. It is not clear 
which side was primarily responsible for beginning this deterioration, but 
certainly each side contributed to it. Taschereau claimed that he had con-
sulted the clergy in advance about the Act and received the enthusiastic 
endorsement of at least one bishop. 30 Since he had been acting in response 
to appeals from religious communities in the first place, 31 he felt he had 
26 Parti Liberal, Le Gouvernement Taschereau (Quebec, 1923), p. 88. 
27 Le Devoir, 14 avril 1921. 
28 Fonds Taschereau, Taschereau to Mgr. P.-E. Roy, 20janvier 1922. 
29 Ibid. 
30 The bishop was undoubtedly Mgr. Ross, whose new diocese of Rimouski was 
poverty-ridden. Among leaders of religious communities, Taschereau's former classmate, 
Mgr. Fran~ois Pelletier of the Quebec Seminary was the most prestigious to support the law 
publicly. RUM ILLY, op. cit., tome XXVI, p. 237; Le Solei/, 16 mai 1921. 
31 The rush of institutions to register with the Bureau of Public Charities substan-
tiates this claim. Montreal institutions applied in particularly great numbers within weeks of 
the first opportunity . Dates of affiliation are in the second "Director's Report" (1924), 
Appendix B. See also Fitzpatrick Papers, Superieure provinciale des religieuses de Notre 
Dame de charite du Bon Pasteur to Fitzpatrick, 31 janvier 1931; and J.-J.-B. Derome to 
Fitzpatrick, 1 septembre 1921. 
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further reason to assume episcopal approval. Instead, the sincerity of his 
government's commitment to traditional French Canadian values was being 
questioned in the Catholic press, and Sauve was scoring political points 
partially because of the leaking of confidential correspondence and the 
refusal of Church spokesmen to deny the substance of his accusations. 
During the 1923 provincial election campaign, the Public Charities Act 
figured prominently in a virtual war between the Liberals and L'Action 
catholique, which although not technically an official spokesman, was 
closely tied to the Archdiocese of Quebec. Taschereau was accused of 
intimidating the aged Cardinal Begin as a means of silencing the journal, 
and two of his ministers sought damages from its publisher. Action Sociale 
Ltee., for printing a libelous campaign leaflet. Never very tolerant of 
personal criticism from any source, 32 Taschereau may well have felt he 
had a legitimate grievance in this case. Once convinced that religious 
authorities had initially assented to the Act, he would naturally suspect 
that the bishops had been goaded into reversing themselves by Bourassa, 
editor Jules Dorion of L' Action catholique and their own ultramontane 
colleagues such as Bishops Cloutier and Labrecque, and then manufactur-
ed objections to the Act in order to justify their new position. 
On the other hand, the course of events raises questions about how 
accurate and comprehensive a preview Taschereau actually gave the 
hierarchy, or whether he advised them how soon the Act would be passed. 
The Catholic press had not been forewarned by their usual sources with-
in the Church, and the Conservative opposition, to which defense of 
Church prerogatives had often been entrusted in the past, seemed totally 
unprepared. Before granting royal assent to the Act, moreover, Lieut-
enant-Governor Fitzpatrick had felt it necessary to consult Cardinal Begin 
privately. 33 Finally it appears that the committee of bishops appointed to 
study the legislation did so only after its passage. There followed a epi-
demic of broken confidences and veiled threats during which the Premier 
of Quebec was unable or unwilling to negotiate reasonable compromises 
with the hierarchy; negotiation on the Government's behalf was left to 
Fitzpatrick and David. 34 Not even the conclusion of the 1923 election 
campaign and the passage of an amendment which gave individual bishops 
the power to veto the registration of institutions within their diocese laid 
the controversy to rest, even though Taschereau had been promised that 
the latter would be sufficient. 35 
Taschereau began the escalation by publicizing Begin's confidentially-
tendered advice that Fitzpatrick should sign the bill. This forced the Lieu-
32 While the Public Charities controversy was in progress, Taschereau was having 
the Legislature jail a scandal-mongering newspaper editor and even threatening to silence 
the man's lawyer. Canadian Annual Review (1922) , pp. 711-715; RUMILLY, op. cit. , tome 
XXVI, pp. 165 and 173. 
33 Fitzpatrick Papers, Fitzpatrick to Begin, 4 aout 1921. 
34 Ibid ., Fitzpatrick to Roy , 14 janvier, 1922; Fitzpatrick to Rev. Pere Calmein, 
1 aout 1921. David actually negotiated amendments to the Act with Mgr. Ross. RuMILLY, 
op. cit., tome XXV, p. 237 and tome XXVII, pp. 203,289-291. 
35 Fonds Taschereau , Taschereau toR. Villeneuve, 9 janvier 1936. 
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tenant-Governor to protest that "je n'ai jamais pretendu que I' approbation 
du cardinal-archeveque du Quebec constituait une adhesion a Ia loi des 
autorites religieuses 36 ." One can imagine Begin's anger since he appeared 
to have pre-empted the work of his own committee of bishops studying 
the Act and since his advice to Fitzpatrick did not really imply that he 
personally approved of contents. The premier was in tum the victim of 
betrayed confidence when the contents of the bishop's formal protest 
were leaked to L' Action Catholique. No longer able to argue in the Le-
gislature that the hierarchy approved of the Act, Taschereau began to 
quote testimonials received from lower clergy whose charitable works 
were made possible by public assistance. The Catholic press responded 
by accusing him of extorting these testimonials. 37 
Fully two years later, the monthly L'Action Franraise was able to 
provoke a new exchange by claiming that the hierarchy was still opposed 
in principle to the Public Charities Act. Taschereau threatened to withhold 
financial support from a nursing community and Mgr. E.-A. Deschamps 
for the building of a new hospital unless Archbishop Gauthier of Mont-
real repudiated the claim. Gauthier strongly insisted that he had no obliga-
tion to confirm or deny journalistic speculation just because the men 
behind L' Action Franraise happened to be clergy of his diocese, and that 
in any case he could not speak for the entire hierarchy. 38 Here and in 
still later episodes Taschereau was ruthless in holding the needy for a 
political ransom, and insensitive to the Church's embarrassing predica-
ment -that is, an internal division between clergy engaged in charitable 
work, and those more concerned about the broader implications of state 
intervention. Yet the bishops were also guilty of some insensitivity, for 
while accepting the financial benefits of the Public Charities Act, they 
were tacitly endorsing an accusation of anti-clericalism against the govern-
ment carried on in the Catholic press. 
III 
The distrust and the provocations on both sides well illustrate the 
intensity of the Public Charities controversy, but of course they do not 
entirely explain it. To determine what lay beneath the surface is a more 
complicated problem. Clearly it contained the elements of a classic ideo-
logical confrontation between Church and State, and publicly at least, the 
Act was attacked almost entirely on ideological grounds. True, L' Action 
36 Fitzpatrick Papers, Fitzpatrick to Bourassa, 24 aout 1921. 
37 La Patrie, 22 octobre, 1922, quoting Taschereau in the Throne Speech debate. 
Some testimonials do in fact sound considerably exaggerated. Besides that of Mgr. Pelle-
tier (Le Solei/ , 16 mai 1921), see Fitzpatrick Papers, Superieure de !'Hotel Dieu de Montreal 
to Dr. L.-A. Lessard (Director of the Bureau) 8 septembre, 1922 ; RuMILLY, op. cit . , tome 
XXVI, p. 178, and the 1923 "Director's Report", p. 33. 
38 Action Franr;aise , juillet, 1924; Fonds Taschereau, Taschereau to Mgr. Gauthier, 
15 and 29 aout, 1924; and Gauthier to Taschereau, 21 aout and 9 septembre, 1924; and 
Deschamps to Taschereau, 22 aout 1924. 
IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONS IN QUEBEC 175 
Catholique warned of the cost of "laicizing" charitable institutions, citing 
the higher expenses incurred by Protestant institutions which had no 
unpaid clergy among their personnel. 39 But this argument simply ignored 
the government's case without refuting it: if Quebec's system of private 
and local assistance was to survive, it needed provincial subsidies in addi-
tion to the services and facilities provided by religious communities. In 
any case critics were more often preoccupied with the alleged incompat-
ibility of this law with Catholic doctrine, enunciating clearly ultramontane 
claims about the responsibilities of Catholic legislators. Bourassa's bitter 
portrayal of the smooth-talking "mossieu L'Etat" seducing the innocent 
Superior of a religious house with the promise of great riches constitutes 
a striking illustration of the anti-etatiste ideology described by Brunet. 40 
Moreover his articles strongly suggest that the publisher of Le Devoir 
was as much disturbed by the principle of state intervention as by provi-
sions of the particular Act in question. The same conclusion may be 
inferred from a survey of the other issues which preoccupied Catholic 
journalists in the early 1920's: at home, a succession of provincial initiatives 
deemed objectionable; abroad, the anti-clericalism of postwar governments 
in Czechoslavakia, Poland and Italy. 41 The pattern in Quebec seemed 
all too familiar, especially if one also took note of the prewar French 
experience wherein anti-clericals and freemasons consciously attacked 
the Catholic faith by usurping the social functions of the Church. No one 
expressed this more succinctly than cure E.-V. Lavergne, in a series of 
articles following the 1923 election campaign. One of them cited a French 
author on "les trois eta pes de l'anti-clericalisme" in politics. "A son ori-
gine, l'anti-clericalisme apparait comme une reaction insurrectionnelle 
contre la domination maternelle de l'Eglise. Dans son developpement, il 
se produit comme une elimination successive et comme un ecartment 
systematique des maternelles influences de l'Eglise. " 42 
It is also conceivable that the critics' professions of faith in the good 
intentions of the present government were not entirely sincere , and that 
they believed that traditional rouge anti-clericalism was thriving within 
the Liberal Party once more. As Fitzpatrick reminded Bourassa, it did 
not make sense to oppose the Public Charities Act simply because it 
afforded a precedent for anti-clerical regimes of the future : any subsequent 
administration determined to reduce the influence of the Church could 
achieve its aims without appealing to precedent. 43 David and Taschereau 
39 L'Action Catholique, 11 and 18 fevrier 1921. 
40 Le Devoir, 19 avril 1921. 
41 On domestic issues, see DUPONT, op. cit ., passim . On international affairs see 
L'Action Catholique throughout February and March 192], and for a fuller analysis of this 
newspaper, Richard JoNES, L'ldeologie de /'Action Catholique , 1917-1939 (Quebec , 1974), 
pp. 35-190. 
•2 L'Action Catholique, 19 fevrier 1923. See other formulations, ibid., 21 avril and 
3 mai 1921; and L.-A. PAQUET, Etudes et Appreciations : Themes Sociaux (Quebec, 1922) 
pp. 290-311. John Me MANNERS , Church and State in France, 1870-/9/4 (London, 1972) 
would not quarrel with the interpretation of French events. The problem is of course whether 
it was reasonable to impute similar motives to Quebec legislators. 
43 Fitzpatrick Papers, Fitzpatrick to Bourassa, 8 aout 1921. 
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had not themselves ever championed rouge causes, but the Provincial 
Secretary's father, Senator L.-0 . David, had certainly done so and Tasche-
reau had been a tormentor of ultramontanes ever since his student days. 
Beyond this Catholic newspapers were evidently sensitive to anti-clerical 
sentiments "fashionable" in the social circles from which Taschereau, 
David and other political leaders were drawn. 44 One militant (and there-
fore unofficial) Liberal organ stirred things up by attributing opposition 
to the Public Charities Act to the fear that unhealthy conditions prevailing 
in charitable institutions operated by religious communities would be 
exposed by government inspectors. 45 Bourassa claimed to know of a self-
confessed anti-clerical already retained by the Provincial Government as 
a medical inspector. 46 In short, some critics at least appeared to believe 
that they were already fighting against anti-clericalism, and not merely 
defending religious principles against some future onslaught. 
In defending the legislation, Taschereau was thus forced to define 
his own ideological position. This he did by distinguishing between ultra-
montane pretensions, which he rejected on the incontravertable authority 
of his uncle, the former Archbishop of Quebec, and the responsibility to 
preserve French Canada's Catholic heritage and character, which he 
accepted fully. 47 If the existing system of welfare organization was to 
survive, he repeated, the Province had to provide heavy financial assistance. 
But if the Government failed to discharge its constitutional responsibility 
to oversee the expenditure of public funds, non-Catholics within the 
province would be justifiably disturbed and other Canadians confirmed in 
some of their prejudices about Quebec. 48 Echoing the message though not 
the style of Laurier's 1877 speech on political liberalism, Taschereau 
scorned the philosophy of a "Catholic" party: 
. . . avez-vous remarque comme nos adversaires ont recours a ce vieux re-
proche, qu'on voudrait pourtant voir bien mort, que le parti liberal est celui de 
l'anti-ch!ricalisme, que son programme est Ia mainmise de l'etat sur !'instruc-
tion publique, Ia charite et les reuvres sociales, qu'on se dirige inconsciem-
ment vers des abimes, que Ia laicisation de tout ce qui n'est pas de notre do-
maine est a l'affiche, mais que heureusement le parti conservateur, detenteur 
des bons principes, dispensateur du royaume des cieux et de Ia felicite eter-
nelle, est sur Ia breche pour nous sauver du naufrage et assurer notre salut. 49 
Unfortunately for Taschereau, neither demonstrations of the virtues 
of the particular Act in question nor general protestations about the 
innocence of Quebec liberalism could terminate the controversy. No 
doubt some journalists and clerics sincerely believed that state interven-
tion in the realm of social assistance was by definition anti-clerical, and 
could be so obsessed with ideological considerations that they lost sight 
44 L' Action Catho/ique, 21 fevrier 1921. 
45 Le Pays , cited in DUPONT, op. cit., p. 81. 
46 Le Devoir , 16 avril 1921. 
47 RuMILLY , op. cit., tome XXVII, pp. 158-159. 
48 Taschereau's reply to Mgr. Roy, cited above, was repeated publicly in a speech 
to the Montreal Reform Club. Le Devoir, 26 avril 1926. 
49 Ibid. 
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of the practical implications of their positions. But it does not seem 
plausible that senior Catholic officials would- have acted on the basis of 
such considerations alone. Even the aged and conservative Cardinal Begin 
is said to have recognized the dilemma in advising the clergy in charge 
of overburdened institutions, "Eh bien, faites-le [register with the Bureau] 
mais n' en parlez pas." so A small minority in the hierarchy were in fact 
militant ultramontanes, and most bishops knew from experience that 
genuine anti-clericals were not in control of the Liberal Party. s 1 Histor-
ically, the strategy of the Roman Catholic Church in French Canada had 
always been to co-operate with political authority, at least to the extent 
of avoiding public confrontations and seeking practical compromises. Dis-
senters from this tradition normally found themselves in conflict with other 
religious authorities as well as with the state. Even while the Public Char-
ities controversy raged, Church and State reached a number of com-
promises in the attempt to modernize Quebec education. 52 The Catholic 
journalists predictably railed against these changes, but they received little 
if any public support from the hierarchy. The amendment of a controversial 
adoption law was also negotiated peacefully in 1924, despite provocative 
newspaper commentary. 53 
If accommodation was possible on other issues concerning Catholic 
doctrine and influence, then what made the Public Charities Act excep-
tional? The most conclusive form of evidence, the internal correspondence 
of religious authorities, is not yet open to researchers. Still, it may be 
fruitful to seek an explanation in the character of both Church and State 
as institutional rather than merely ideological forces. 
In dealing with the evolution of social welfare, the modem observer 
can too readily adopt a present-minded or idealistic conception of the 
state. We know how social assistance "must" be organized in a modem 
industrial society. The state is an agency which protects the economically 
weak in a variety of ways. Private and local organizations have a role to 
play, and voluntary action is considered worthwhile for all concerned. Yet 
only the state can really command and organize the redistribution of wealth 
on a massive scale. Thus it is natural to condemn or ridicule those who 
stood against "progress", forgetting that they may have judged the state 
not as an abstract model but by the reputation of its most immediate 
manifestation. Apart from any suspicions that it wished for ideological 
reasons to lessen Church influence, the Quebec Government of 1921 was 
not an organization to which anyone would confidently entrust responsi-
bility for a problem which he considered "moral" as well as social and 
economic. 
so RuMtLLY, op. cit., tome XXV, p. 123. 
51 Radical critics of Quebec's educational system had achieved little in their most 
recent campaign, and the moderate rouge T.-D. Bouchard had aUegedly been denied re-
election to the Legislature in 1919 primarily because of his views on the taxation of eccle-
siastical property. Ibid ., tome XXIV, p. 89. 
52 B.L. VtGOD, "'Qu'on ne craigne pas l'encombrement des competences': Le 
Gouvemement Taschereau et !'Education 1920-1929", R.H.A.F. septembre 1974. 
53 DUPONT, op. cit., pp. 109-115. 
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Taschereau had been Premier for less than a year when the Public 
Charities Act was introduced, but his party had been in power since 1897 
and built up a remarkably strong patronage system. Hardly a sphere of 
government activity was not manipulated for partisan advantage, and 
the practice could be ruthless. 54 It was not even pretended that the pro-
vincial civil service was a meritocracy, ss and Bourassa quite justifiably 
scorned the Government's promise to appoint only "des hommes d'une 
haute valeur morale" to positions within the Bureau. "C'est excellent, 
c'est admirable, c'est meme touchant; mais de Ia coupe de l'ideal aux 
levres de Ia realite il y a parfois loin - surtout quand Ia politique et le 
patronage s'en melent ... II arrive plus souvent qu'autrement que Ia 'valeur 
morale' cede le pas a l'intrigue, au brocantage, au favoritisme, a mille 
considerations qui n'ont rien de 'haut' ni de 'moral'." 56 The attempts 
described earlier to extort political support, later pressure on the Director 
of Public Charities to bend rules for institutions favoured by political 
leaders and Taschereau's promise to reward the favourite charity of an 
influential newspaper publisher through the Bureau all confirmed fears 
that the law "cree, aux mains de l'Etat, un instrument commode de 
patronage, de nouveaux moyens d'empietements sur l'initiative privee, 
de nouvelles methodes de domination S7." 
The Premier also had a personal reputation for impatience and into-
lerance which cast doubt upon his ability to accept the restrictions of a 
genuine partnership, the "co-operation intime et effective conjointement 
avec les reuvres d'assistance publique" promised by the Act. 58 Could a 
government which rushed such important and sensitive legislation through 
the House in a few hours be trusted to administer it with due regard for 
the legitimate interests and feelings of those outside its ranks? 
Even without sharing Bourassa's wild fantasy in which anti-clerical 
bureaucrats harrassed religious establishments with midnight visits, 59 
54 The most extreme example was agriculture Minister J.-E. Caron, whose control 
over existing farmers' organizations was partly responsible for the formation of the anti-
government Union Catholique des Cultivateurs in 1924. Often the favouritism was directed 
by the Ministers themselves through departments and agencies, but it was also the means 
by which Government backbenchers maintained their local power and status. I have been 
able to cite numerous cases, as weD as evidence of contemporary awareness of the pro-
blems in "Responses to Social and Economic Change in Quebec: The Provincial Administra-
tion of Louis-Alexandre Taschereau 1920-1929" (unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, Queen's 1974). 
See especially pp. 19-21, 47-48, 67-70, 191-193, 232-3 , 245-8, 410-412. 
55 The Provincial Civil Service Board was abolished in 1926, Statutes of Quebec 
16 Geo. V (1926), c. 14. 
56 Le Devoir, 16 avril, 1921. 
57 Fitzpatrick Papers, Vol. 32 is filled with examples. The publisher was Lord 
Atholstan of the Montreal Star and the Charity was the Child Welfare Association. Ibid., 
Howard Faulk to Fitzpatrick 15 August 1921 and W.A. Styles to Fitzpatrick 22 October 
1921. Taschereau was doubly fortunate that this episode never became public, because he 
had declared the intention not to support interdenominational agencies. The quotation is 
from PAQUET, op. cit., pp. 324-325. 
58 Article 5 b. 
59 Le Devoir 15 avril, 1921. Once again there seems to be an unstated comparison 
with the French experience under Emile Combes. See Albert GUERARD, France: A Modern 
History (Ann Arbor, 1%9), pp. 362-364. 
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Church leaders could be understandably disturbed by the thoroughness 
of some regulations included in the Public Charities Act. Article 10, requir-
ing the Bureau of Public Charities to evaluate "les merites de l'reuvre, 
son but, sa nature, sa fin et sa maniere de disposer des octrois re~us", 
might easily tempt an underpaid and unscrupulous inspector to hint that he 
expected a bribe. 60 Articles 24 and 27, in requiring documentation of a 
patient's indigence, could in theory compromise the confidentiality of his 
relationship with a priest. In principle the state must oversee the expen-
diture of public funds, but was this really necessary in the case of the 
Church? Or was it, as L' Action Catholique commented, an insult to the 
religious orders which had been serving French Canadian society for three 
centuries, and to individuals who contributed generously without feeling 
it necessary to check up? 61 In short, the reputation of the Quebec Govern-
ment blinded many people to less sinister and more plausible explanations 
for the extent of regulations: that Taschereau really was anxious to avoid 
stirring up an anti-clerical backlash or reinforcing English Canadian pre-
judices by appearing to hand the Church a blank cheque ; or that he feared 
a drain on the Provincial Treasury which his Government would be 
powerless to plug once grants became "automatic" and costs rose. 62 
Anti-etatisme unquestionably influenced political developments in early 
twentieth-century Quebec, but this was an attitude sustained as much by 
practical experience and observation as by ultramontane, laissez-faire or 
other abstract theories. 
Alongside understandable suspicion of the state as an institution, 
Church leaders appear also to have been suffering from uncertainty about 
the future character of social welfare itself. The Church embraced, and 
the Public Charities Act purported to endorse, a concept of indigence 
ill-suited to the urban, industrial setting. The unfortunate or unwise in-
dividual, utterly destitute and abandoned, was no longer the typical welfare 
case as he had been in the countryside. Postwar Quebec had to confront 
the problem of general economic weakness -insufficient wages, sporadic 
employment and lack of compensatory resources such as home-grown 
food, the· extended family and mutual aid which counted for so much in 
the rural milieu . Ex-muris treatment, income support and non-monetary 
forms of social assistance such as counselling and supervised recreation 
had not yet been integrated into the concept of "charity". 
While some sociologists in the late Duplessis era marvelled at the 
adaptability of the Quebec clergy to changing circumstances, particularly 
their ability "to occupy successively all strategic posts of the society", 63 
60 The leadership of the Catholic Labour movement was extremely critical of such 
conditions in labour inspection. See Le Solei/ 20 juillet 1920; La Vie Syndicale avril 1926; 
[M. FoRTIN], Memoire sur le Syndicalisme Catholique au Canada (Montreal, 1927), p. 14. 
61 L'Action Catholique, 15 avril 1921. 
62 This fear was partially responsible for the Taschereau Government's resistance 
to federal old age pension and farm credit schemes during the 1920's. 
63 Hubert GUINDON, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered," and Jean-
Charles FALARDEAU, "The Role and Importance of the Church in French Canada," both in 
M. RIOUX and Y. MARTIN, eds., French Canadian Society (Toronto, 1963). See especially 
pp. 152-159, 352-357. 
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it was far from clear in the early 1920's that this would happen quickly 
enough in the realm of social assistance. It was equally possible that the 
Public Charities Bureau, even if sincerely intended by the government only 
to support traditional forms of public assistance, would prove to be the 
embryo of a vast, competing bureaucracy. New services demanded by 
society , which the Church had been slow to organize, would be provided 
by state employees who would thus displace the clergy in a critical func-
tion . Outwardly, Church and State were debating the classic question 
"Whose jurisdiction is it?" but the Church's real crisis was over the ques-
tion "What is to be done?" If confident of answers to the latter question, 
and of its ability to act quickly on the basis of those answers, the Church 
may not have felt so threatened by a plan for state support. The Catholic 
hierarchy might even have given stronger support to later demands for the 
reform and expansion of social assistance in Quebec. 64 After all, the 
programmes of personal income support advocated in the 1930s and 1940s 
did not necessarily imply the nationalization or secularization of institu-
tional charity. As early as 1926, Catholic Union leaders in Quebec saw no 
ideological obstacle to Quebec's participation in the federal Old Age 
Pensions scheme. 6s 
All available evidence 66 suggests that Church leaders suffered from 
this kind of insecurity. Quebec's most respected charitable agency, the St. 
Vincent de Paul Society, was just beginning to review its work in light 
of modern conditions when the postwar recession struck. For the re-
mainder of the 1920s it struggled just to "keep up" with new problems, 
and never formulated its master plan. 67 Partly as a result, local chapters 
naively undertook responsibilities beyond their capacity during the de-
pression of the 1930s. 68 It is also clear that defenders of the traditional 
system of social assistance against the alleged dangers of the Public Char-
ities Act never formulated positive proposals for the adaptation of an 
essentially rural system to the urban environment. From the rapid increase 
of lay personnel in Church-operated charitable institutions, moreover, one 
can surmise that by the close of the First World War there had not yet 
been trained a corps of administrators and specialists within the Church 
to provide necessary new services. 69 For rhetorical purposes some op-
64 That is not to ignore other forces in Quebec which resisted such reforms, notably 
the philosophy of individual politicians, the pressure of business interests and widespread 
popular prejudice against all taxation, especially in the countryside. On the last phenomenon 
see Stewart BATES, Financial History of Canadian Governments (Ottawa, 1939), pp. 146-
149 and Everett C. HUGHES, French Canada in Transition (Chicago, 1963 edition), p. 172. 
65 Confederation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada, Proces Verbal 1926 , pp. 
34-35 ; La Vie Syndicate , fevrier 1928 ; Canadian Annual Review 1929-1930, p. 206. 
66 Further evidence should appear once archdiocesan records are accessible for 
this period (in fifteen to twenty years, under present regulations), and more specific insti-
tutions and categories of assistance receive scholarly attention. 
67 Robert RUMILLY, La Plus Riche Aumone : Histoire de Ia Societe de St. Vincent 
de Paul (Montreal, 1946), pp. 134-148. 
61 RUMILLY, Histoire de Ia Province de Quebec , tome XXXIII, pp. 69, 150-154. 
69 Staff salaries (excluding doctors' fees) in charitable institutions were rising 
astronomically, more than doubling to $881,232 in hospitals and nearly trebling to $423,664 
in refuges between 1916 and 1922. Sessional Papers /925, "Benevolent Institutions". 
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ponents of the law warned that it was part of a conspiracy against Church 
influence, but the dearth of specialized clerical personnel was a far more 
practical and logical reason to fear that a mere scheme of provincial 
subsidization would lead to a secularization of social services. In this 
connection it should also be noted that urban parish priests were the most 
energetic opponents of what few specialized agencies did begin to appear, 
and that their opposition dissipated only when they felt certain of a place 
in the new welfare structures. 7° Finally, French Canadian Catholic leaders 
cannot have failed to notice the growing acceptance of the lay social 
worker and the nondenominational agency (albeit private) among . their 
English-speaking co-citizens in Quebec. 71 
Thus it appears that the Public Charities Act provoked a major con-
troversy not only because it violated an ultramontane interpretation of 
Catholic principles, and was suspected of being inspired by anti-clerical 
sentiments and designs. Reservations about the manner in which the 
Province might administer public assistance were too well founded in 
practical experience, and the terms of the Act too conducive to abuse 
for opposition to be dismissed as "ideological". At the same time, the 
period in question should be recognized as one of considerable apprehen-
sion within the Church as an institutional structure as well as an ideo-
logical force. New developments in Quebec education, public health and 
labour organization all were posing challenges to the social role and in-
fluence of the clergy. In many cases the Catholic press issued dire warnings 
and a few clergy resisted compromise or adaptation. But almost always 
clear programmes of adaptation were formulated by which the clergy 
could hope to maintain their influence. Preoccupied with positive tasks, 
they left intransigent opposition to a vocal but small minority. In this sense 
the Public Charities Act was an exceptional challenge and threat, and 
the resulting tension could only be heightened by the apparent insensitivity 
of civil authorities to this fact. 
Despite the controversy, the Public Charities Act accomplished its 
immediate objectives. Under the competent direction of Dr. Alphonse 
Lessard, it helped many institutions survive their postwar crisis and later 
in the 1920s supported the expansion of existing facilities and the creation 
of new ones. By 1930 there were 207 institutions registered with the 
Bureau, serving 141,000 clients during the course of the year. Their annual 
budget was nearly $15,000,000, almost five times the 1919 figure; the direct 
provincial contribution was $2,738,608, an increase of $1 ,702,438 since the 
first full year of the Bureau' s operation. 72 During the 1930s, when statutory 
sources could not begin to finance relief costs, the Public Charities Fund 
was permitted to draw upon ordinary provincial revenues. The only major 
structural defect proved to be the power of municipalities to define indi-
gence, for as in the case of educational and other reforms of the period, 
70 MoNGEAU, op. cit ., pp. 49-50 ; HUGHES, op. cit., pp. 104-105. 
71 Andre M . GUILLEMETTE , " Welfare in French Canada," in Canadian Welfare , 
Jan.-Feb. 1966. 
72 Above, notes 16 and 17 ; Quebec Statistical Yearbook 1932, p. 173. 
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many rural councils used their prerogatives to avoid expenditure and so 
frustrate the intentions of provincial authorities. Fortunately, no major 
urban councils behaved in this way. 
Ultimately, however, the conservative forces seem to have won out. 
Although other factors were undoubtedly involved, political leaders de-
clined for almost 40 years to undertake a systematic reform of Quebec • s 
social welfare structure. Advances came only in the guise of unwelcome 
federal intrusions and ad hoc responses to domestic pressures. Invariably 
these were schemes of direct payment only and never represented a desire 
to broaden the philosophy or modernize the administration of social 
service. 
